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Great Books on Finance · Chapter 3

A Random Walk Down Wall Street: the book that put numbers behind the case for indexing

For 14 years, the Wall Street Journal ran a surreal contest: professional analysts picked stocks against newspaper staff who picked theirs by literally throwing darts at a board. The result, uncomfortable for the financial industry, is one of this book's central anecdotes, first published in 1973 and still, edition after edition, one of the best-selling investment books of all time.

Quick Answer

'A Random Walk Down Wall Street' (1973), by economist Burton Malkiel, defends the efficient market hypothesis: stock prices already incorporate all publicly available information, making it extraordinarily difficult to consistently beat the market through analysis or active stock picking. The book popularized the Wall Street Journal's famous dartboard contest, in which random selections competed surprisingly closely against professional analysts' picks, and it concludes with a highly influential practical recommendation: for the vast majority of investors, a low-cost index fund is the strategy with the best ratio of effort, cost, and expected long-term result.

The book that turned an academic theory into a bestseller

Burton Malkiel, an economist at Princeton University, published the first edition of 'A Random Walk Down Wall Street' in 1973. It has since been reissued more than a dozen times (the latest well into the 2020s), incorporating new data with each edition that, according to its author, keeps confirming the same central thesis: it's extraordinarily difficult to consistently and sustainably beat the market as a whole over time.

The title refers to the idea that stock price movements resemble a 'random walk': if all available information is already reflected in the current price, the next move depends on information that's still unknown, and by definition, unknown information can't be predicted consistently.

The Wall Street Journal dartboard contest

Between 1988 and 2002, the Wall Street Journal ran a recurring contest that became one of the book's most-cited anecdotes: a group of professional analysts picked stocks using their best judgment, while a group of newspaper staff picked theirs by literally throwing darts at a page with stock listings pinned to a wall.

Over the 14 years the contest ran, the professionals beat the darts a little more than six times out of ten, a result that at first glance seems to favor active management. But the benchmark index itself, the Dow Jones, beat the professionals in nearly as high a share of rounds as the professionals beat the darts, and the experts' picks tended to lean toward more volatile, riskier stocks than the market as a whole, which considerably tempers the apparent triumph of professional stock-picking.

Castles in the air versus firm foundations: two ways of justifying a price

Malkiel reviews two schools of thought in the book about how prices form. The 'firm foundation' theory holds that every asset has a calculable intrinsic value, and that price tends to converge toward that value over time (the same central idea in Graham's book on the intelligent investor). The 'castle in the air' theory holds that price depends largely on what other participants believe other participants are willing to pay, a chain of expectations that can become completely disconnected from the underlying real value.

Malkiel uses this second theory to explain historical episodes of collective euphoria like the ones we cover in our guide to historical speculative bubbles: as long as enough people believe the price will keep rising, it will keep rising, until that castle, built entirely on expectations rather than real foundations, collapses.

Why the book's practical conclusion is to index

If prices already reasonably efficiently reflect available information, trying to systematically beat the market through analysis or active stock picking becomes a zero-sum bet before costs, and a losing bet on average after deducting active management fees, which are usually several times higher than those of an index ETF.

This conclusion, developed with academic detail in Malkiel's book, is exactly the argument we lay out with more recent data in our guide to index funds versus active management: it's not that beating active management is impossible in any given period, but that doing so consistently, net of costs, over decades, is extraordinarily rare.

  • Prices already incorporate publicly available information, making them extremely hard to consistently anticipate.
  • The dartboard contest showed that random selection competes surprisingly closely with professional selection.
  • Active management fees further reduce the odds of beating the market net of costs.

How to apply the book to your own portfolio

The practical application is straightforward: for the vast majority of individual investors, a low-cost global index fund or ETF, held consistently for years, is more likely to outperform an actively managed portfolio than trying to identify in advance which manager or which specific stock will beat the market in the future.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is the efficient market hypothesis?

It's the idea, central to Malkiel's book, that asset prices already incorporate all publicly available information, making it extraordinarily difficult to predict their future movement systematically and consistently.

What was the Wall Street Journal dartboard contest?

A recurring contest held between 1988 and 2002 in which stock picks made by professional analysts competed against picks chosen at random by throwing darts. The professionals won a little more than half the time, but the benchmark index itself beat the professionals at a similar rate.

What are 'castles in the air' in Malkiel's book?

It's the theory that an asset's price depends largely on collective expectations about what others will be willing to pay in the future, rather than on a calculable intrinsic value, which can fuel speculative bubbles.

Does the book say you should never invest actively?

The book doesn't claim it's impossible to beat the market in any given period, but that doing so consistently and net of costs over decades is extraordinarily rare, which is why it recommends low-cost indexing as the default strategy for most investors.

Is this book still relevant almost fifty years after it was published?

Malkiel has updated the book across more than a dozen editions, incorporating data from each decade, and maintains that the evidence accumulated since 1973 continues to support the same central conclusion about the difficulty of consistently beating the market.

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